The recent airing of "THE CROSSING" on cable television has once again brought up the subject of the battle of Trenton and its place a turning point in the American War of Independence. Those of you who know me know as well I portray a Grenadier of the Hessian Infantrie Regiment Von Donop. The von Donop Website got over 400 hits the night of the show, and it shows what the potential is out there for our websites to both educate the public and perhaps pick up a good recruit.

Anyway, with the awful portrayal of the battle in the movie, it might be educational for us all to actually revisit the Battle of Trenton to see just what transpired. As General James Grant wrote on Dec 27th to Colonel Carl Emil Ulrich von Donop, the commander of the Hessian Grenadier brigade: "I did not think that all the Rebels in America would have taken that brigade prisoners." So, in a nutshell, what happened?

First of all, the posts in New Jersey were much too scattered for the number of troops expected to hold them. Trenton, Bordentown, and Princeton form a sort of triangle pointing at Pennsylvania. Behind these posts, the next British troops were at New Brunswick and behind that at the Amboys. George Washington was certainly aware that the posts were too far apart, writing as early as 14 December that he "...hoped to attempt a Stroke upon the forces of the enemy who lay a good deal scattered." Donop had wanted to concentrate his and Rall's brigade at Bordentown and hold Trenton with a rotating guard of 150 men. Rall apparently objected to this and convinced General Grant (British commander in New Jersey) to intercede with Howe to give him his own command at Trenton when Howe was at Trenton on Dec. 14th. Donop thought this "improper ambition" and apparently he and Rall did not see each other after that, although Donop was nominally "in charge" of both his and Rall's brigade.

Secondly, one should remember that the Hessians at Trenton had been in the field since arriving in America, having participated in the battles of Long Island, in the storming of Ft. Washington, (where the Rall and Lossberg regiments led the assault), and again present at White Plains, battles in which all the regiments had suffered casualties. The chase across New Jersey was as tiring to the chasers as the chased. At Trenton, Rall found himself harassed continually by New Jersey militia, conducting various partisan operations, and at one point, the von Lossberg Regiment "did not take off their cartridge pouches for 8 days." It was unsafe for couriers to move between the posts. And in one instance Rall sent an escort of 100 men and one of his battalion guns to get a packet of letters from Trenton to Princeton. Major Carl von Bauermeister, the Adjutant General for the Hessian Corps in America, wrote the Landgraf after the battle: "The day before the battle Rall had written to Donop that his brigade was extremely fatigued because of the miserable weather and continuous service and was in no condition to defend the post without relief or reinforcements; that only two officers in his regiment were fit for duty; and that the other regiments had the same complaints, above all the gallant Regiment von Lossberg, which had suffered more than any other throughout the campaign."

Thirdly, the command structure of Rall’s brigade was seriously undermanned. A Hessian regiment of one battalion normally included a Colonel, a Lt. Colonel, and a Major. Rall, although considered an energetic officer, was actually the junior colonel in the brigade. But, due to the following circumstances, he had the command. The actual brigade commander, General Mirbach, suffered some sort of a stroke after the battle of Long Island and was sick in New York. Colonel Carl von Bose, who was to have succeeded him, also fell ill and was still in New York. Colonel Herrington, the commander of von Lossberg's regiment had died of dysentery at Brooklyn, and Colonel Borke of Knyphausen's regiment was convalescing from a wound received leading the regiment at Ft. Washington in New York. Of the other senior officers, Lt. Col. Scheffer of the von Lossberg regiment and Lt. Col. Bretthauer of Rall's regiment were sick, and Major Dechow of Knyphausen's regiment had been wounded twice at Ft. Washington leading an advance party on the works but had stayed with the regiment because Col. Borke had a more serious wound (having taken a ball in the throat).

Fourth, both Rall and Donop asked General Grant for more men, to secure their communications and were both turned down; Grant writing to Donop that: "I can hardly believe that Washington would venture at this season of the year to pass the Delaware" (17 December) and: "..it was making more of the rebels than they deserve." (21 December, in reference to Rall providing that escort of 100 men and a cannon to get letters to Princeton) and finally: "The Rebels have neither shoes nor stockings, are in fact almost naked, starving for cold, without Blankets and very ill supplied with provisions." (21 December). But I think Rall knew he was hanging in the wind, having written Donop earlier: "I am aware of my situation and three battalions are little enough to defend this place, as my honorable brother [officer] himself judges I have not thrown out redoubts as the enemy is all around me...." Rall in particular had wanted men posted at Maidenhead (Lawrenceville) to secure communications with Princeton (so he could throw out more patrols, particularly to the north, toward McKonkey’s ferry), and Donop, although having requested in writing 6 times for more ammunition for his artillery, still only had 9 rounds per gun. (Donop had 2 English 6 pounders). Troops which could have been used in New Jersey had just been sent off to Rhode Island by General Howe.

Fifth, Colonel Rall did not follow a principle of small posts and set up a redoubt at his post. Donop had sent an engineering officer, Captain Pauli, to supervise the building of a redoubt, which Rall chose not to do, having demonstrated to Howe (and himself) that he could hold Trenton without one. His subordinates at the court-martial in 1778-1779 brought this point up again. Rall was certainly in error here, as is evidenced from this passage from the REGLEMENT VOR DIE HESSICHE INFANTRIE: "When a regiment or battalion is posted in a village, which is not far from the enemy, the Chief or Commander must cause a redoubt to be erected on a chosen spot or height, or where it is in some other way advantageous, which is large enough that the Regiment or Battalion has space for itself within." (Editor's Note – Interestingly, both Roger Stevenson in 1772 and Ewald in 1784 say almost exactly the same thing.) Such a redoubt, with artillery, was what Pauli had wanted to erect at the head of the town where the Pennington and Princeton roads meet. This is the spot where Alexander Hamilton's and Henry Knox’s guns silenced Lt. Johann Englhard's 2 battalion guns and enfiladed High Street and Bridge Street which forced Rall to move his regiment and von Lossberg's out of the town.

Sixth, Rall compounded that error by reinforcing failure. Rall formed up his and the Lossberg regiments and then tried to retake the town, marching into a fire sack formed by Mercer's, Stephen's, and Stirling's brigades as well as the American artillery. Here he was wounded, his regiment breaking and routing into the Lossberg regiment, causing much confusion. When Fermoy's brigade appeared on their flank (and practically in their rear), Lt. Col. Sheffer, who was now in command, gave over to the Americans who were calling both English and German to lay down their arms, perhaps as close at points as 50 yards. It may also be worth noting that the Americans were now also in the buildings in the town, and that it was raining and blowing in the Hessians’ faces, and the Hessian muskets were not working at all. South of the town, the Knyphausen regiment tried to retreat along the Assunpink, but wasted so much time trying to bring off its battalion guns through a mire, that it was pressed by both St. Clair's brigade and Stirling's which had moved through the town. Col. Sargent had crossed the bridge over the Assunpink with two cannon and opened fire on the Knyphausen regiment, mortally wounding the commander, Major Dechow. The regiment dissolved as some officers tried to escape and others surrendered (like Maj. Dechow, who died the next day like Rall).

The end result was over 900 Hessians captured, although some 650 escaped to both Bordentown and Princeton.

There is plenty of blame to go round here. Howe, for pushing the posts out so far, and sending all those people off to Rhode Island instead of securing New Jersey. Grant, for not supporting his subordinates. Donop, for not coordinating or following up on his subordinate and making sure his orders were carried out. Rall, for jockeying for position, ignoring what were Standard Operating Procedures, and probable tactical mishandling of his brigade.

And all of them for underestimating their enemy. Atwood says that Col. Minnigerode had wanted to head to Trenton with his battalion, (and in fact was at Crosswicks Creek), but that Donop thought it a bad idea and instead withdrew to Princeton. Atwood wonders if Donop had counterattacked Trenton what the outcome might have been, as Washington’s troops had found rum in Trenton and apparently were in no condition to defend themselves.

Further reading:

Eelking, Max von. The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence 1776-1783. J.G. Rosengarten, trans. (Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2007)

Ewald, Johann von. Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. Joseph P. Tustin, ed. and trans. (New Haven, Connecticut: 1979).

Atwood, Rodney. The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Cassel in the American Revolution. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980)

Smith, Samuel Stelle. The Battle of Trenton. (Monmouth Beach, New Jersey: Philip Freneau Press, 1965)

Lefkowitz, Arthur. The Long Retreat: The Calamitous American Defense of New Jersey 1776. (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999)

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